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Abstract 
The present study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in multifactor productivity growth in 
sixteen European countries from 1995 to 2005. The main aim is to ascertain the role of flexible 
employment contracts and collective labour relationships in explaining the ample differentials recorded in 
the European economy. 
We use the EU KLEMS database for growth accounting and a broad set of indicators of labour 
regulations, covering two distinct ‘areas’ of labour regulation: employment laws and collective relations 
laws. This comprehensive approach allows us to consider arrangements that regulate allocation of labour 
inputs (fixed-term and part-time contracts, hours worked) and the payoff and decision rights of employees.  
We find that, since 1995, European countries have not followed similar patterns of growth. A large 
number of variations between European economies are caused by marked differentials in multifactor 
productivity and part of this heterogeneity is caused by sectoral diversities. We show that, in labour-
intensive sectors such as services, fixed-term contracts, which imply shorter-term jobs and lower 
employment tenures, may discourage investment in skills and have detrimental effects on multifactor 
productivity increases. Employment protection reforms which slacken the rules of fixed-term contracts 
cause potential drawbacks in terms of low productivity gains. We also find that more stringent regulation 
of these practices, as well as a climate of collective relations, sustain long-term relationships and mitigate 
these negative effects. 
JEL Classifications: O40, O43; O47; J50 
Keywords: productivity, labour regulation, comparative institutions. 
1. Introduction3 
Over the past decade, disappointing productivity growth has been recorded in the 
European economy and the catching-up of Europe on the U.S. has slowed significantly. 
Productivity differentials have mainly involved market services. Indeed, new research 
(van Ark et al., 2008) sheds some light on differential patterns of growth in labour-
intensive sectors, such as services, explaining the different performances of multifactor 
productivity recorded in the European economy and the US. These findings encourage 
further inquiry into the role of management of labour resources and their regulation 
with regard to successes or failures in Europe.  
As known, various hypotheses on the role of labour regulation have been 
advocated, and their relevance has been tested in a growing number of empirical studies. 
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Many investigations analyse the impact of these policies on employment and 
unemployment rates, or on unemployment inflows and outflows, but reserve less space 
for productivity growth. Conversely, the present paper examines the more controversial 
issue of the impact of labour institutions on productivity outcomes, only recently 
addressed by some country studies (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008), or industry-level 
cross-country research (Micco and Pages, 2006; Bassanini and Venn, 2007; Bassanini, 
Nunziata and Venn, 2009)
4.  
The expected impact of the role of labour market institutions on productivity is 
ambiguous and mainly related to restrictions on firing. Scarce attention is devoted to 
fixed-term contracts.  
The deeper motives for promoting labour market flexibility are found in the 
theoretical literature on the potential costs of labour protection. Such protection, as 
argued by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), perturbs the reallocation of resources from 
declining firms to more dynamic ones with above average productivity growth. In 
addition, these protective devices tend to alter the allocation of resources among 
sectors.  
Economies with rigid labour markets manifest a distortion in their innovation 
activities, since they adopt mainly secondary innovations which determine a cost 
reduction in existing goods, but they do not experiment with primary innovations, such 
as those related to new products, characterised by higher returns but also higher 
variance (Saint Paul, 2002)
5. Such economies, which are prevalent in Europe, show an 
international specialization in secure goods, at an advanced stage of their product life-
cycle, and this contributes toward explaining why “Europe appears as less high tech 
than the United States” (Saint Paul, 2002, p. 376) and why it falls behind in terms of 
long-run productivity growth.  
Other key channels able to explain unfavourable consequences are related to 
capital returns and worker effort. Returns of investment are lowered by job protection 
provisions, as shown by Bertola (1994). Analogous negative impacts are brought about 
by worker incentives since labour protection lowers the probabilities of layoffs for 
disciplinary reasons; under less threat of dismissal, opportunistic behaviour is 
encouraged (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). 
By contrast, theoretical arguments in favour of employee protection underline the 
positive effects on productivity of long-term relationships and incentives for workers to 
upgrade their skills. Two main channels might be advocated. First, labour policies may 
increase the stock of human capital through the promoting of training. Second, for a 
given stock of human capital, “policies that reduce social conflict might condition 
workers’ effort and their willingness.” (OECD, 2007, p.65) 
                                                 
4These recent works, which examine country and sectoral differentials, use a cross-country approach and 
verify differences across sectors with a ‘difference in difference’ method.  
5 As documented by Saint Paul (2002), “That Europe tends to innovate more in established products than 
in new ones is evident from the data. For example, in 1993 the US accounted for 54% of world patents 
in biotechnology, 51% in computers, and 32% in communication, versus 13%, 14% and 13%, 
respectively, for France plus Germany. By contrast, these two countries accounted for 25% of world 
patents in instruments, 25% in construction, and 52% in transportation, versus 6%, 5% and 3% for the 
US” (Saint-Paul, 2002, p.376). M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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In this vein, Nickell and Layard (1999) signal that employment protection has a 
positive effect, because it increases job tenure and stimulates on-the-job training. Belot, 
Boone and van Ours (2007) also highlight that, when effort and investments in human 
capital are non-contractible, employment protection solves hold-up problems; 
protection of this kind encourages employees to invest in match-specific human capital 
by increasing the probability of the survival of the match, and this beneficial effect is 
stronger in those sectors where firm specialization in competences is more important. 
However, there is a trade-off between these positive effects and the negative 
consequences of firing costs. In any case, there is a positive optimal level of 
employment protection. In addition, Wasmer (2002) shows that different levels of 
employment protection affect skills in different ways: low levels favour general portable 
skills, higher levels determine firm-specific skills.
6  
Institutional interactions are of strategical importance, some of which are related 
to the wage setting system. A limited discretionality of employers in wage setting lead 
them to adjust employment levels, and only protective provisions make union wage 
bargaining power effective; this explains why employment protection and unions are 
quite often complementary institutions, since binding rules on employment contracts 
may be useless if firms are free to adjust wages downwards (Boeri and Van Ours, 2008, 
chapter 13). 
On the other hand, collective bargaining rules and sectoral agreements which 
generate low spreads between firms may prevent opportunistic behaviour by employers 
when on-the-job training is observable, but not verifiable. In such circumstances, 
workers may accept a wage cut with a promise of obtaining on-the-job training, but the 
firm has an incentive to renege on its promise and reaps some gains from cheap labour 
(Malcomson, 1999). Institutional constraints on wage setting, more enforceable if 
collective contracts are extended by law to third parties at national or sectoral level, thus 
impede hold-ups and generate the upgrading of skills
7.  
Other links with incentive schemes are provided by efficiency wage models. As 
shown by Güell (2000), the choice of fixed-term contracts is plausible in a context of 
efficiency wages, but only if there is a sufficiently high transformation rate of fixed-term 
contracts into permanent ones; otherwise, shirking is always strictly preferred. “The idea 
behind this is very simple: if a worker always becomes unemployed independently of the 
effort expended, there is no way to give incentives to the worker by paying him a higher 
wage” (Güell, 2000, p.10).  
In a context of asymmetric information, other institutional complementarities 
occur and are related to the role of works councils and the presence of employees on 
supervisory boards. As shown by Freeman and Lazear (1994), management tends to use 
                                                 
6From a welfare point of view, under imperfect insurance markets, some components of firing costs, such 
as severance payments, may be justified when employees are risk-averse (Pissarides, 2001). 
7 In our analysis, we introduced an indicator for collective rules which takes into account whether the law 
extends collective contracts to third parties at national or sectoral level. Other wage constraints are 
represented by minimum wages. As is known, minimum wages improve incentives for investing in 
training, partly because they reduce demand for unskilled workers, who have greater incentives to invest 
in training to avoid unemployment. High unemployment benefits, however, may offset this effect by 
reducing the opportunity cost of remaining unemployed.  
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information strategically, declaring bad states of the firm to extract more effort from 
employees; in their turn, employees, knowing this, disregard management and rationally 
choose low-effort strategies
8. Legal norms and elected works councils overcome this 
communication problem, as they provide more information, inducing more effort; 
Freeman and Lazear also argue that, by enhancing job security, employees attribute 
more importance to expected future profits, show greater loyalty, and invest more in 
firm-specific skills. 
To sum up, this brief excursus demonstrates that multiple dimensions of labour 
regulation must be taken into account and that their impact helps to explain national 
and sectoral disparities in productivity growth. 
In the present paper, we analyse these disparities in Europe and then focus on 
some driving forces such as flexible employment contracts and collective labour 
regulation to explain various patterns of multifactor productivity. As said above, other 
recent studies examine the influence of labour protection on productivity and focus 
most of their analysis on dismissal rules, with some extensions to other forms of 
regulation (see, for instance, Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn, 2009). The present paper 
does not consider rules on firing restrictions and mainly examines only those norms that 
increase flexibility on the margin; it focuses on those institutional devices which involve co-
decision making and verifies the role of co-management when works councils and co-
determination rules apply. 
In order to obtain a comprehensive database, we considered two distinct ‘areas’ of 
labour regulation, employment laws and collective relations laws. As regards the first, we 
selected some of the indexes which summarise the regulation of allocation of labour 
inputs in the productive process: part-time, fixed-term contracts and hours worked.
9 For 
the second area, collective relations, we included not only payoff rights, but also workers’ 
decision rights, which may have some impact on productivity
10. For instance, computing 
the presence of employees in worker councils or on boards of directors yields a more 
                                                 
8 This occurs when employees choose a high effort level only in bad states, when low effort does not 
allow firms to survive and workers rationally expect to lose their jobs. Vice-versa, in good states, they 
obtain higher utility with low-effort strategies. 
9 The dataset used in our study includes some measures which reflect the binding rules governing 
individual labour contracts which do not exactly coincide with those provided by the OECD and 
specifically aimed at measuring employment protection. Note that, according to the OECD 
employment protection indicator (EPL index), the strictness of employment protection consists of three 
different summary indicators which refer, respectively, to regular employment, temporary employment 
and collective dismissals. A detailed description of the method adopted to obtain these three summary 
indicators is given in OECD (2004, Chapter 2). In our case, we include rules on part-time contracts and 
hours worked, which are not considered in the OECD EPL index.  
10 Botero et al. (2004) index includes rights to unionise and to collective bargaining, but these are not the 
same features computed by the OECD indicator (i.e. trade union density, coverage by collective 
agreements, centralisation and co-ordination of wage bargaining). Conversely, Botero et al. (2004) index 
for union power takes into account information and decision rights of employees which are not 
included in the OECD indicator. The authors compare their database with that sponsored by other 
institutions, such as the OECD and World Bank, as follows: “What distinguishes our data from 
previous efforts is a combination of a significant coverage of countries and a comprehensive approach 
to labor market regulations” (p. 1341). For more details, see the Appendix of the present paper. M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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precise evaluation of arrangements that give a ‘voice’ to employees and which may 
represent additional channels influencing productivity
11. 
The second set of information is on growth and is taken from the EU KLEMS 
Growth and Productivity Accounts. This database is the outcome of a research project, 
financed by the European Commission and aimed at analysing productivity in the 
European Union (Timmer et al., 2007). It allows a detailed analysis of European 
economies and explicitly considers important issues such as average skills of the labour 
force, capital services in information and communication technology, and their 
diversities across sectors and countries. 
By merging statistical information made available by these two sets of databases, 
with additional data from EUROSTAT, as described in Section 2, we explore the 
potential impact of labour regulation on productivity performances for a sample of 
European Economy countries over the period 1995-2005. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides data description; Section 3 
presents our main findings on country-sectoral growth differentials and labour 
arrangements; Section 4 offers econometric estimates; Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data description 
As mentioned above, our empirical investigation relies on several databases, EU 
KLEMS accounts, the indexes on employments laws and collective relations elaborated 
by Botero et al.(2004)
12, EUROSTAT and OECD databases.  
The first step of our research involved matching them and achieving a 
disaggregated analysis at sector and country levels. First, the availability of data and the 
needs of a large and consistent sector-country profile led us to select only 16 countries 
out of the 27 European Union members and to re-arrange the NACE rev.1 sections 
into 8 industries. This made it possible to compare the following economies: Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
This selection of countries was dictated by data availability and included two sets of 
countries: i) 13 Old Member States; ii) 3 New Member States. The second set is quite 
heterogeneous and comprises Hungary and the Czech Republic, two “market oriented” 
economies with some similarities to the Anglo Saxon countries, and Slovenia, a country 
which has adopted some of the institutions typical of the German model (European 
Commission, 2004)
13. 
                                                 
11A third indicator that measures various social security provisions, introduced by Botero et al. (2004), was 
not been included in our analysis.  
12 Botero et al. (2004) contributes to the growing literature which maintains the causality link between ‘law 
and finance’ and which supports the thesis that insufficient shareholder protection causes ownership 
concentration of low degrees of capitalization (La Porta et al., 1998). The legal origin hypothesis has 
recently been applied to labour regulation by Botero et al., (2004), whose main statement dictates that 
‘the historical origin of a country’s laws shapes its regulation of labour and other markets’ (Botero et al., 
2004, p.1340). In our work, more than adopting these propositions, we simply use the database 
elaborated by this study. 
13 Of the new Member States, Slovenia is one of the countries with above-average unionization levels, 
with a works council system, ( replacing the former Jugoslavian model of worker self determination) and  
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The selected sectors consist of: 1) Primary Sector (agriculture, mining and 
quarrying), 2) Industry (manufacturing and energy sectors), 3) Construction, 4) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, 5) Hotels and Restaurants, 6) Transport, Storage and 
Communications, 7) Financial Intermediation, Real Estate and Business Services, 8) 
Community, Social and Personal Services. 
We drew the dependent variable of our econometric estimates, the Multi-Factor 
Productivity (MFP) growth, from the EU KLEMS database, which was extensively used 
in the study of van Ark et al.(2008). One of the main advantages offered by this database 
is the detailed breakdown of industries and service sectors and the decomposition of 
labour productivity; it is also worth noting that this decomposition was computed by 
considering differences in labour quality (high skilled, medium-skilled and low-skilled) 
and a full variety of asset types (distinction between ICT capital and non-ICT capital 
services). Other variables used in the descriptive analysis, see Section 3, value added and 
the contribution of inputs to growth, were also obtained from the EU KLEMS 
database. 
Some explanatory variables of MFP, particularly those describing unmeasured 
innovative input and the quantitative dimension of labour market flexibility, were taken 
from the EUROSTAT database. More precisely: sectoral R&D expenses, standardised 
to value added, were used as a proxy of innovation
14.  
The set of variables related to labour arrangements and institutions consists of 
two main groups. The first, taken from the EUROSTAT database, includes the rate of 
change of employees with fixed-term and with part-time contracts and the rate of 
growth of weekly hours worked; all these variables offer a measure of the actual degree 
of labour flexibility changes.  
The second group consists of two subgroups of labour regulation: employment 
laws and collective relations laws.  
As regards employment laws, we considered the existence and cost of alternative 
arrangements to standard employment contracts, such as fixed-term and part-time 
contracts (extensive margin flexibility)
15, and the cost of increasing the number of hours 
worked (intensive margin flexibility).
16 In addition, we consider the binding role of these 
                                                                                                                                        
with national cross sectors bargaining over pay and working coditions.At the same time, in Slovenia, 
new legislation has been introduced in 2003 “which seeks to regulate temporary agency work, increase 
the flexibility of the Slovenian labour market and provide adequate protection for temporary agency 
workers, increase the flexibility of the Slovenian labour market and provide adequate protection for 
temporary agency workers” (European Commission, 2004, p. 64) As a result, Slovenia recorded a more 
systematic use of such employment contracts.  
14 Unfortunately, EUROSTAT data on R&D were not available for all 128 (16 countries time 8 sectors) 
sector-country observations.  
15 More precisely, the existence and cost of part-time contracts were computed as the average of 1) a 
dummy variable equal to one, if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of full-time workers, 2) 
a dummy variable equal to one, if terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating full-
time workers. The existence and cost of fixed-term contracts were computed as the average of 1) a 
dummy variable equal to one, if fixed-term contracts were only allowed for fixed-term tasks and 2) the 
normalised maximum duration of fixed-term contracts. 
16 Botero et al. (2004) computed the maximum number of “normal” hours of work per year in each 
country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). When the hours worked exceed this maximum, a M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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employment laws, which is obtained under the assumption that provisions regulating 
employment contracts are more stringent in those sectors where propensities to use 
flexible employment arrangements are higher. These propensities are in turn identified 
by the share of flexible arrangements (incidence of fixed-term and part-time contracts). 
Hence, we assumed that the protection of workers is more binding in those sectors 
where the proportions of fixed-term and part-time employees out of total employees are 
higher. 
This methodology, following Bassanini and Venn (2007) and Bassanini, Nunziata 
and Venn (2009), provides a solution to the problem of labour market policies being 
typically defined at country level, whereas we wished to make comparisons at country 
and sector level. Along similar lines, we considered that, in each sector, the higher the 
actual increase of weekly hours worked, the more important the impact of related costs 
of increasing the number of hours worked
17.  
The second subgroup regards collective relation indexes: i) labour union power, 
which measures the statutory protection and bargaining power of unions
18; ii) the 
collective disputes index, which refers to the protection of workers during collective 
disputes
19. As regards the binding role of labour union power and collective disputes 
indicators, we weighted them at sectoral level, by considering the component of 
dependent employees respect to total employment and the share of employees involved 
in collective disputes. 
Also, we collected the OECD database for Product Market Regulation, that 
measures the anti-competitive regulation (the direct and indirect impact of product 
market regulation on sectors of the economy that use the output of non-manufacturing 
sectors as intermediate inputs in the production process (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). 
Unfortunately, this indicator is not available for the Eastern countries nor for all sectors 
considered in our analysis.  
                                                                                                                                        
firm uses overtime. The cost of increasing hours worked is computed as the ratio of the final total wage 
bill to the initial one. 
17 In our study the role of separation costs is only captured by sector and countries dummies.  
18 This is computed as the average of the following seven dummy variables which are one: 1) if employees 
have the right to unionise, 2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining, 3) if employees have 
the legal duty to bargain with unions, 4) if collective contracts are extended to third parties by law, 5) if 
the law allows closed shops, 6) if workers, or unions, or both, have the right to appoint members to the 
Boards of Directors, 7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law.  
19 This indicator is computed as the average of the following eight dummy variables which are one: 1) if 
employer lockouts are illegal, 2) if workers have the right to industrial action, 3) if wildcat, political, and 
sympathy/solidarity/ secondary strikes are legal, 4) if there is no mandatory waiting period or 
notification requirement before strikes can occur, 5) if striking is legal even if there is a collective 
agreement in force, 6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, 7) if third-party 
arbitration during a labour dispute is mandated by law, 8) if it is illegal to fire or replace striking workers.  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
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3. Growth accounting in the European Economy: 1995-2005 
3.1 The EU/US comparison  
After the mid 1990s, the 15 European Union countries recorded a decline in 
productivity growth, from a previous average annual value of 2.4 percent, during the 
years 1973-1995, to 1.5 percent during the period 1995-2006. The slowdown seems even 
more remarkable in comparison with the American experience, where a reverse trend of 
acceleration was observable: in the US, average annual labour productivity passed from 
1.2 percent in 1973-1995 to 2.3 percent from 1995 to 2006 (van Ark et al., 2008).  
By definition, labour productivity is obtained from the difference between the 
rates of growth in output and labour input. From this accounting, the gap between 
Europe and the US was caused not only by a lower increase in real output, but also by 
an increase in the growth rates of total hours worked (from -0.4 in the years from 1974-
1994 to +0.9 in 1995-2006). Conversely, the American economy registered a falling 
increase in hours worked, from +1.6 in the first period to +0.9 in the second.  
The second finding deducible from growth accounting is related to the 
breakdown of labour productivity. By following Solow (1957) and making appropriate 
adjustments which take into account the heterogeneity of the labour force as well as the 
distinction between ICT and non-ICT capital per hour, one has the following: 
 
Labour Productivity= Labour Composition + ICT capital per hour + 
+ Non-ICT capital per hour + MFP 
 
where the last component, MFP, is multifactor productivity, the share of output 
growth not attributable to inputs. Applying these accounting rules and using the new 
EU KLEMS database, which makes it possible for the first time to detect the role of 
high-skilled labour and information and communications technology capital, van Ark et 
al.(2008) identified some crucial results.  
 
Table 1: Labour productivity in the market economy: EU economies and the US, 1995-2004 
  Labour 
Productivity 
Labour 
composition
ICT 
cap. 
per 
hour 
Non ICT 
capit. per 
hour 
Multifactor 
productivity  
 1=2+3+4+5  2  3  4  5 
European 
Union  1.5  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.3 
US 3.0  0.3 0.8  0.4  1.4 
Standard 
Dev.  1.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  1.0 
Source: EU KLEMS data base, van Ark et al.(2008, Table 4). M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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As Table 1 shows, neither a worsening in labour force skills (component 2) nor a 
decline in capital deepening (component 4) may be considered as determining factors in 
the slowdown of European productivity growth. On the contrary, the disappointing 
performances of the European countries were due above all to the lower growth of ICT 
investments and MFP.  
In addition, it must be emphasised that a significant component of the 
productivity gap was attributable to the services sector. Indeed, at a sectoral level of 
analysis, the services sector, representing nearly half of the market economy, accounted 
for a large proportion of the productivity gap between Europe and the US. 
However, an important question remains as to whether the European scenario is 
homogeneous or whether there are large variations between countries. 
 
Table 2: Major sector contribution to average annual labour productivity growth: market economy, 1995-
2004 
  Market 
economy 
ICT 
production 
Goods 
production 
Market 
services  Reallocation 
European 
Union  1.5 0.5  0.8  0.5  -0.2 
US  3.0  0.9  0.7  1.8  -0.3 
Source: EU KLEMS data base, van Ark et al.(2008, Table 5) 
 
3.2 European cross- country differentials  
Our analysis offers some answers and provides a growth accounting for some of 
the countries belonging to the European Union from 1995 to 2005. 
Table 3 provides a synthetic picture and shows: i) the growth rate of the GDP and 
its breakdown into hours and productivity growth; ii) the breakdown of productivity 
growth into its principal contributions
20.  
Our main findings for EU13 show that the lowest position was occupied by Italy, 
in terms of growth of value added (column 1), mostly because of its collapse in 
productivity growth. It is followed by Germany where, however, the disappointing 
performance in output growth was primarily caused by a marked fall in hours worked. 
Conversely, at the top we find Finland and Spain, but here, too, the difference between 
the two economies is worthy of note since Finland recorded an acceleration in 
productivity gains, whereas Spain had extensive growth, as a consequence of the greater 
output contributed by the hours worked. 
                                                 
20See Appendix, Figure A1 for hours and productivity growth by sector and country.  
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Table 3: Contributions to Growth in Real Value-Added: European Economy 1995-2005 
 
Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS database. 
 
Table 3 shows that the slow productivity growth of the old member states of the 
European Union, below 2 percent, is a widespread phenomenon, with some notable 
exceptions, two in Northern Continental Europe, Finland and Sweden, and two in the 
Anglo-Saxon economies, Ireland and the UK.  
In addition, in the same group of four successful cases, the differentials in 
contribution to growth are impressive. Focusing on these countries and considering the 
importance of the various components, we have the situation illustrated in Figure 1. 
  
Output contribution
from   Labour productivity contributions from    
 
Growth 
rate of 
Value 
Added  
Hours 
Worked  
Labour 
Productivity  
Labour 
Composition  
 
ICT capital 
 
per Hour
 
 
 
Non
 
-
 
ICT 
 
capital per 
 
our
 
 
 
MFP
 
  
 
LP 
 
contributions 
 
from 
 
knowledge 
 
economy 
 
  
 
Austria 
 
  
 
2.19
 
  
 
0.45
 
  
 
1.74   0.25   0.47   0.42   0.60   1.31  
Belgium   2.04   0.58    1.46   0.21   0.79   0.72   -  0.26   0.74  
Denmark   1.81   0.52    1.28   0.23   0.84   0.37   -  0.17   0.90  
Finland   3.42   0.79    2.63   0.22   0.52   0.46   1.43   2.17  
France   2.09   0.24    1.84   0.37   0.30   0.57   0.60   1.27  
Germany   1.32   -  0.23    1.55   0.01   0.40   0.69   0.46   0.86  
Ireland    7.26   1.94    5.31   0.55   0.46   3.47   0.82   1.84  
Italy    1.18   0.55    0.64   0.17   0.25   0.68   -  0.46   -  0.04  
Netherlands    2.51   0.64    1.87   0.35   0.55   0.51   0.45   1.36  
Portugal    2.18   0.45    1.72   0.22   0.73   1.57   -  0.80   0.15  
Spain    3.44   1.96    1.48   0.43   0.42   1.42   -  0.78   0.07  
Sweden   2.87   0.19    2.67   0.27   0.44   1.04   0.91   1.62  
United Kingdom    2.72   0.57    2.15   0.44   0.77   0.62   0.31   1.52  
Average (UE13)   2.69   0.67    2.0
3 
  0.2
9 
  0.54   0.96   0.2
4 
  1.06  
Std. Dev. (UE13)   1.54   0.6
2 
   1.1
2 
  0.1
4 
  0.19   0.84   0.6
8 
  0.6
9 
 
Czech Republic   2.09   -  0.33    2.41   0.28   0.62   1.42   0.10   1.00  
Hungary   4.21   0.27    3.92   0.68   0.27   0.30   2.67   3.62  
Slovenia   3.88   -  0.27    4.13   0.71   0.45   2.14   0.82   1.99  
Average (UE16)   2.83   0.52    2.30   0.34   0.52   1.03   0.42   1.28  
Std. Dev.(UE16)   1.42   0.63    1.18   0.18   0.18   0.81   0.84   0.88  
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Figure 1: Contributions to labour productivity growth, 1995-2005 
Finland
Labour Composition
ICT capit al per Hour 
Non‐ICT capit al per
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Ireland
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United Kingdom
Labour Com posit ion
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Non‐ICT capit al per
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MF P  
  
Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS database. 
 
The four cases tell different stories. In Ireland, a significant increase in 
substitution of capital for labour and processes of deepening in (non-ICT) capital 
intensity are recorded. Similar measures characterised the mid-1970s to the late 1980s 
when, on average, European countries engaged catching-up with the US. For the other 
Anglo-Saxon country, the UK, two components of the knowledge economy (high 
quality of the labour workforce and capital ICT services) contribute to an important 
extent. Lastly, the Northern countries, and Finland in particular, were the only 
economies in Europe which showed the indubitable incidence of multifactor 
productivity growth.  
It can be argued that the very different starting points reached in 1995 by the 
various EU member countries (with some economies with a level of development and 
innovative capabilities not very distant from the US, and others which lie behind) may 
play an important role.  
One expected hypothesis is that a traditional catch-up pattern explains 
productivity growth within EU economies, and that this process is more evident in a 
disaggregation by broad sectors. The present analysis reveals that, in each industry, 
higher labour productivity growth is recorded in those countries with lower levels of 
efficiency, the result of adaptation and imitation of foreign technology. But a simple 
graphical representation (Figure 2) shows that a negative correlation between levels and 
growth rates, and therefore a catch up process, is significant only in two sectors: i) 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; ii) and Financial Intermediation, Real Estate and Business 
Services, with a coefficient of correlation in both cases around -0.45 and significant at 
the 10% level. 
To sum up, even if the question of the differential initial conditions remains and 
deserves further research, a preliminary analysis, based on simple correlations between 
levels and growth of labour efficiency, shows weak associations. These results are 
consistent with those obtained by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn: the authors, 
addressing the role of firing restrictions on MFP growth, find “no evidence that these  
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regulatory restrictions affect the technological catch-up with the industry productivity 
frontier. On the contrary, their impact does not appear to vary significantly with the 
distance to the frontier or across different types of institutional frameworks”(p. 392).  
Table 3 also summarises contributions to labour productivity growth, which 
reveal cross-country diversities. To better evaluate the relative importance of the various 
components, we computed their percentage contributions to labour productivity, as 
shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Contributions to labour productivity growth in European Economy, 1995-2005 
 
Source: our elaborations on EU KLEMS database 
 
The first result is that the main difference arising in the EU-US comparison and 
attributable to MFP (see Table 1), is confirmed in the intra-European context: the main 
disparity in labor productivity growth between individual European economies is to be 
found not in differences in the intensity of the production factors, but in multifactor 
productivity. Indeed, the standard deviation of MFP (39.15%) is quite larger than that of 
the contribution of labour composition (6.99%) or of capital deepening ICT (16.37%) 
(see Table 4).  
This motivates to extend the analysis of MFP  in terms  of  country-sectoral 
differentials. 
3.3 Multifactor productivity growth: national/sectoral differentials 
Multifactor productivity growth measures the efficiency improvements in the use 
of inputs; in other terms, it measures the reduction in input costs to produce a given 
  
Labour 
Composition  
ICT 
capital 
per Hour  
Non-ICT 
capital per 
our 
MFP    
Austria    14.47  26.85  24.29  34.39  
Belgium    14.27  54.57  49.28  -  18.12  
Denmark    18.29  66.03  29.13  -  13.45  
Finland    8.38  19.83  17.35  54.45  
France    20.17  16.33  30.88  32.62  
Germany    0.36  25.82  44.33  29.49  
Ireland    10.44  8.68  65.35  15.52  
Italy     26.26  39.70  106.42   -  72.37  
Netherlands    18.94  29.61  27.40  24.04  
Portugal    12.82  42.64  91.02  -  46.47  
Spain   29.25  28.00  95.43  -  52.68  
Sweden    10.27  16.58  39.14  34.02  
United Kingdom   20.45  35.84  29.07  14.64  
Average (UE13)   15.72  31.58  49.93  2.77  
Std. Dev. (UE13)   7.71  16.11  29.99  39.64  
Czech Republic   11.71  25.51  58.76  4.02  
Hungary    17.21  6.88  7.74  68.17  
Slovenia    17.22  10.95  51.87  19.97  
Average (UE16)   15.66  28.36  47.97  8.01  
Std. Dev.(UE16)   6.99  16.37  28.97  39.15  
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amount of output. This measure reflects disembodied technical changes, i.e., those 
changes not embodied in the quality of inputs.  
More precisely, MFP growth ( A ln ∆ ) is calculated as the real growth of output 
minus a weighted growth of inputs: 
 
ijt
L
ijt ijt
K
ijt ijt
X
ijt ijt ij L v K v X v Y A ln ln ln ln ln ∆ − ∆ − ∆ − ∆ = ∆     (1) 
 
where  ∆ lnYijt ,  ∆ ln Xijt , ∆ ln Kijt and ∆ ln Lijt denote, respectively, the growth of 
output (Y), intermediate inputs (X), capital (K) and labour (L) in country i and sector j, 
between t-1 and t, while 
X
ijt v ,  K
ijt v  and  L
ijt v  are the two period average shares of inputs, 
X, K and L, respectively, on total output. 
As clearly described by Inklaar et al.(2008, p. 148-149), many factors may cause 
changes in MFP, since this residual measure includes pure technological change, 
organizational improvements and effects from unmeasured output and inputs that could 
be captured by R&D expenses. Hence, in addition to technical innovation, there are i) 
effects due to organisational and institutional changes, ii) shifts in returns to scale, iii) 
any other deviations from competitive assumptions of equalities between prices and 
marginal costs; iv) all computing errors due to the existence of unmeasured inputs.  
All these effects may have different impacts at country and sectoral level, as 
shown in Figure 3. The first result is that the main difference arising in the EU-US 
comparison and attributable to MFP (see Table 1), is confirmed in the intra-European 
context: the main disparity in labor productivity growth between individual European 
economies is to be found not in differences in the intensity of the production factors, 
but in multifactor productivity. Indeed, the standard deviation of MFP (39.15%) is quite 
larger than that of the contribution of labour composition (6.99%) or of capital 
deepening ICT (16.37%) (see Table 4). Substantial differentials also arise at country-
sectoral level. 
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Figure 2: Labour productivity: levels and growth rates (Average annual growth rate 1995-2005) 
Primary Sectors (Agriculture and Mining) corr =-0.29  Industry (Manufacturing and Energy sectors) corr =-0.12 
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Figure 2 (Continued) : Labour productivity: levels and growth rates (Average annual growth rate 1995-2005) 
Hotels and Restaurants corr=-0.06  Transport, Storage and Communications corr=0.08 
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Figure 3: Contributions of MFP to growth of sectoral added value European Economy 1995-2005 
Primary Sectors (Agriculture and Mining)  Industry (Manufacturing and Energy sectors) 
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Figure 3 (Continued) : Contributions of MFP to growth of sectoral added value European Economy 1995-2005 
Hotels and Restaurants  Transport, Storage and Communications 
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Figure 4: R&D 1995-2005 in EU countries (percentages of sectoral value added) 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT. Of our sample of 16 EU countres Austria, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia 
are not included  
 
One general finding, common to almost all the countries, is the positive change of 
MFP in Industry, i.e. in manufacturing and energy sectors (as shown in Figure 3). For a 
plausible explanation one has to recall that MFP, as a residual measure, includes 
measurement errors, and R&D and other intangible assets are the more prominent 
examples causing statistical errors when computing inputs. This component, as shown 
in Figure 4, has a great importance in industry and it is worth noting that, on average, in 
EU12, its cumulated growth over the decade is of more than 30%. 
A second finding concerns the positive contribution of MFP to productivity 
growth in the Wholesale and Retail sector. One likely explanation, as stressed in van Ark 
et al.(2008), is that the ample diffusion of chain stores and inventory systems applied to 
the trade sector are prominent examples of sectors where returns to scale, as already 
observed for the American economy (Foster et al., 2006), have played a significant role 
and explain faster growth in MFP. 
Good performances have also been found in Transport, Storage and 
Communications. One reason for this finding concerns the role of deregulation and of 
changes in entry barriers, since the removal of restrictions encourages innovation and 
promotes growth (Aghion and Griffith, 2005). These impacts had been empirically 
tested by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), who examined the role of entry liberalization in 
market services and found a spill-over positive effect on manufacturing, but, 
unexpectedly, no benefits in services.  
These paradoxical results may be due to some statistical problems since in Europe 
deregulations have been introduced in different times in different industries, but their 
aggregation in broad sectors does not permit to isolate the single institutional innovation M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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and causes an insufficient change over time of the explanatory variables which represent 
these innovations. Inklaar et al.(2008) signal that moving to a more detailed analysis for 
individual service sectors is convenient since it overcomes these problems; in particular, 
for Post and Telecommunications, the authors document that the effect of barriers to 
entry has a negative and significant impact on MFP growth, whereas no significant 
effects are detected for Transport and Storage. An explanation offered is “that the 
change in barriers to entry for the post telecommunication services was so strong that 
its effects became identifiable through the general noise in the data, while this was not 
the case in transport” (Inklaar et al., 2008, p. 167). In our study, where the two sectors 
(Transport and Storage and Post and Telecommunications) are not considered 
separately, we simply find, on average, good results in terms of MFP growth in various 
countries, as shown in Figure 3. 
Performances recorded in other services, such as hotels and restaurants or 
financial sectors, are more disappointing. In these cases, some failures due to the 
increasing use of fixed-terms contracts may have been some of those organisational and 
institutional changes behind the MFP  patterns. This point is examined in the next 
section. 
3.4 MFP and labour regulation 
When looking at the above growth accounts from the perspective of labour 
utilisation and regulation, we focus on the summed contributions of distinct groups of 
factors: i) diffusion of fixed-term, of part-time contracts and of overtime; ii) regulation 
and restrictions of these arrangements; iii) other forms of labour protection related to 
collective relations.  
3.4.1 Employment contracts  
Fixed-term contracts 
In the case of rigid regulations for permanent employees, fixed-term contracts 
play the role of ‘buffer stock’; their importance is thus conditioned by several crucial 
factors such as the role of firing and hiring costs, volatility of labour demand along the 
business cycle, elasticity of substitution between permanent and temporary workers, and 
relative wages of permanent and fixed-term employees
21.  
The diffusion of fixed-term contracts in some European countries has generated 
increasing interest, and the main theoretical predictions concern the labour demand 
effects of these contracts, as recently seen in Blanchard and Landier (2002); Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay (2002); Goux et al.(2001)
22. However, as mentioned in Section 1, the related 
implications on productivity are less well explored
23.  
                                                 
21 Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) examine the Italian experience in the period 1995-2000 and focus on the 
“honeymoon effect” of labour market reforms, aimed at allowing some flexibility by implementing 
reforms at the margin, i.e., those involving fixed-term contracts but not open-end contracts. For the 
Italian case, other evidence is obtained by examining the role of exemption clauses exonerating small 
firms from job security norms (see Schivardi and Torrini, 2008). 
22This literature shows that, in terms of labour demand, the discounted present value of a permanent 
contract with respect to a fixed-term one is affected, among other variables, by the separation rate,  
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The spread of fixed-term contracts may exert on productivity two probable, but 
opposite, effects, as reviewed in Bassanini and Venn (2007). On one hand, they favour 
all reallocation processes triggered by shocks in technology or demand which call for 
faster adaptation and job changes. They may also have an incentive effort, under the 
assumption that fixed-term workers intend to obtain permanent positions; hence, these 
arrangements may be screen devices to select new employees, and are thus “potential 
‘stepping stones’ to generally preferable permanent jobs” (Engellandt and Riphahn, 
2004, p. 2).  
On the other hand, fixed-term contracts reduce training motivations for workers 
and firms and discourage investments in firm-specific human capital. This issue has not 
received robust empirical support, since at country level, if one excludes Spain, there are 
no significant correlations between the percentage of workers on temporary contracts 
and training activities, as shown by Bassanini et al.(2005).
24 In addition, restrictions on 
the types of jobs for which these contracts are permitted, such as rules that limit these 
contracts to seasonal or occasional activities, or rules for their allowed duration, may 
influence their impacts. Within sectoral analysis, the effects of fixed-term contracts may 
be positive in the case of industries with a higher layoff propensity, but less beneficial 
when firms can restructure through internal adjustments (Bassanini and Venn, 2007).  
This is a matter for further investigation applying econometric estimates. Some 
evidence, in any case, is important.  
First, it is interesting to examine the increasing share of fixed-term contracts over 
the period 1995-2005 in the full sample of 16 countries of our database (Figure 5). The 
lowest values are recorded in the UK, the highest are recorded in Spain (Figure 6) 
which, conversely, has the lowest proportion of part-time contracts (Table 5). The 
sector with the highest share of fixed-term contracts is a service sector, i.e., Hotels and 
Restaurants (Figure 7). 
                                                                                                                                        
hiring and firing costs, and the probability for the firm of replacing its workforce (see Garibaldi, 2006, 
chapter 4). 
23 Analysis of employment protection on productivity has been considered by Autor et al. (2007). This 
study examines the impact of dismissal costs on distorting production choices and thus on productivity, 
by considering the adoption of wrongful discharge protection by US state courts from the late 1970s to 
the early 1990s. 
24 The absence of a significant correlation is obtained "if we exclude the case of Spain - an obvious outlier 
because of the very high share of temporary labour - countries with a similar share of temporary 
workers have vastly different levels of training participation.” (Bassanini et al., 2005, p.7). For Spain, the 
probability of receiving on-the- job training in 1999 was 22% lower for workers with fixed-term 
contracts than for workers with open-end contracts (Dolado et al., 2002). M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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Figure 5: Evolution of proportions of fixed-term contracts - 16 European countries, 1995-2005 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
 
Figure 6: Proportions of fixed-term by countries (average values 1995-2005) 
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Figure 7: Proportions of fixed-term contracts by sectors (16 European countries, average values 1995-
2005) 
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A description of the evolutionary trends is offered by fixed-term contract growth 
by country and sector. Figure 8 shows the falling diffusion of these labour arrangements 
in Anglo-Saxon economies, whereas they have increasing importance in services, at 
sectoral level. (Figure 9). For Hotels and Restaurants, which shows the highest incidence 
of fixed-term contracts, the acceleration over the period 1995-2005 was remarkable, 
with cumulative growth of more than 70% (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 8: Growth of fixed-term contracts by countries (average annual rate of changes, 1995-2005) 
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Figure 9: Growth of fixed-term contracts by sectors (average annual rate of changes, 1995-2005) 
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Figure 10: Growth of fixed-term contracts in hotels and restaurants sector 
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT 
 
Part-time contracts 
The reasons explaining the lower productivity of part-time workers with respect 
to full-time ones are examined in OECD (1999). First of all, they have high job turnover 
which lowers incentives for firms to provide training, and lower levels of compensation, 
which make it more difficult for part-time workers to finance training themselves. 
Indeed, “in most countries, well over one-half of them have job tenures of less than five 
years, while the opposite is true for full-timers. Also, at least in European Union 
countries for which data are available, “the average incidence of training for part-timers, 
relative to full timers, is around 70 per cent for men and 60 per cent for women. Most of 
these differences remain after controlling for the lower educational attainment and 
lower job tenure of part-time workers, and the fact that they tend to be found in smaller 
establishments, different sectors and have a different age structure from full-time 
workers. (OECD, 1999, p.22) 
Other explanations include minimum levels of set-time required for individual 
tasks, which turn out to be a drawback for the efficiency of part-time workers. 
However, these negative effects are less significant when part-time contracts are not 
related to the quality of part-time compared with full-time jobs, but to adverse cyclical 
conditions. Other important factors concern preferences and attitudes for part-time 
workers and their differentials by gender, since the voluntary choice of this type of 
contract may weaken the causal link between these arrangements and efficiency
25.  
Hours worked 
As mentioned above, hours worked in the European Union rose rapidly after 
1995, and this change, by simple accounting, had a direct negative impact on per hour 
value-added growth. However, moving beyond the simple growth accounting, we need 
to explore the indirect economic impact of hours worked on productivity. 
                                                 
25 See also EUROSTAT (1997) which focuses on part-time arrangements in the European Union.   
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
396 
Figure 11: Weekly hours worked by country and sector in EU countries, 
average annual growth rates 1995-2005  
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Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT data. 
 
One suggested hypothesis is the existence of a negative correlation between the 
growth rates of labour utilisation and labour productivity. For instance, Dew- Becker 
and Gordon (2008) found that an increase in total hours per capita of 1% will reduce 
labour productivity by 0.7% and within Europe, the countries with largest increases in 
hours also experienced the largest decelerations in productivity growth and comparable 
findings are obtained by other studies, surveyed in OECD (2007). 
A plausible interpretation is that an increase of work intensity may cause 
diminishing returns when it is obtained with longer hours of work, mainly offered by 
less skilled employees and whose competences are less firm-specific. Also, an increase M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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of labour utilisation may concern worse jobs and tasks of inferior quality. In those cases, 
the ‘composition effect’ of employment or deterioration of quality of jobs may cause an 
overall shift towards worse productivity outcomes.  
A simple graphical representation of weekly hours worked by country and sectors 
is offered by Figure 11.  
A summary of fixed-term and part time contracts, weekly hours worked by 
countries is given in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Fixed-term, part-time contracts, weekly hours worked 
 
Growth 
rate of 
fixed-term 
contracts 
Growth rate 
of part-time 
contracts  
Growth 
rate of 
average 
number of 
weekly 
hours of 
work 
Share of  
workers 
with fixed-
term 
contract 
out total 
workers 
Share of 
part-time 
workers 
out total 
workers 
Growth 
rate of 
average 
number of 
weekly 
hours of 
work 
Austria 4.52  4.81 0.21 8.05 17.12 0.21 
Belgium  5.92 5.64 0.02  8.17  17.70  0.02 
Denmark  -2.15 1.48  0.31 9.94  21.43  0.31 
Finland 2.04  3.46 0.08 17.29 12.29 0.08 
France 2.79 2.12 -0.73  13.91  16.62  -0.73 
Germany 3.36  4.69 0.09 12.59 19.62 0.09 
Ireland -4.51  8.32  -0.55 6.02 14.28  -0.55 
Italy  7.31 8.03 0.07  10.33  8.79  0.07 
Netherlands 6.29  3.89 0.58 13.15 41.53 0.58 
Portugal 9.01  5.25  -0.55 18.18 9.86 -0.55 
Spain 4.90 8.92 0.34  34.54  8.60  0.34 
Sweden 3.53  0.41 0.46 14.91 23.00 0.46 
United 
Kingdom -0.82  1.34  -0.31  6.46  25.06  -0.31 
UE13 3.25 4.49 0.00 13.35 18.15 0.00 
Czech 
Republic  1.58 0.02 -0.49  8.06 5.21  -0.49 
Hungary 2.10  -0.17 -0.33 6.85 3.55 -0.33 
Slovenia  8.87 -0.16 0.03  13.79  7.15 0.03 
   
Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT data 
 
3.4.2 Labour collective relations  
We mentioned above the role of restrictions on employment contracts, but other 
institutions, related to labour collective relations, are likely to have impacts on 
productivity growth.  
A parallel dimension of industrial relations climate concerns bargaining 
governability, as measured by our collective relation indexes. It can be assumed that in 
coordinate market economies, extensive relational and long terms contracts entail more 
reliance on collaborative relationship and on the exchange of private information.  
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Hence, labour regulation may favour and amplify the potentialities and fruitful effects of 
investments in intangible assets and of R&D efforts. 
We utilize additional indexes for collective rules that discipline unionized 
actions
26. Indeed, workers’ position inside the firm is dependent on those provisions 
that regulate hiring, working time and dismissal conditions (summed up into an 
employment laws index), but also on employees’ contractual strength, empowered by 
collective actions (synthesized by a collective relations laws index). 
In a recent survey, Freeman (2007, p.1) identifies “three ways in which institutions 
affect economic performance: by altering incentives, by facilitating efficient bargaining, 
and by increasing information, communication, and trust”. Far from offering a detailed 
description of the multiple channels that can produce these impacts, it must be recalled 
that a “two faces approach”, originally proposed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) for the 
role of unions, and recently reassessed by Bertola (2008), might be advocated.
27 
Labour market regulation offers remedies for market imperfections, as regards 
provisions of insurance, job seeking and training incentives. Hence, the good face 
emphasizes that labour protection, through collective bargaining and provisions that 
favour long-term relations encourage firm specific human capital investments and 
stimulate growth
28.  
Other arrangements, such as legal institutions of codetermination, giving ‘voice’ to 
employees, as explained in Section 1, enhance the efficiency of the firm by permitting 
the flows of communications between management and workers (Freeman and Lazear, 
1995).  
The “bad” face proposes the opposite thesis: labour interventions obstruct the 
free labour market functioning, foster rent seeking, disturb efficient reallocation 
processes, and generate worse labour market outcomes. Benefits of labour regulation 
are thus counterbalanced by costs; for instance, as stressed by Hopenhayn and Rogerson 
(1993), employment protection prevents reallocation of labour and thus reduces 
efficiency. In our perspective, we ask whether labour institutions, by improving the 
functioning of labour markets, end to favouring productivity growth. Some evidence is 
shown in the next subsection.  
From the collective relations laws we selected, as mentioned in Section 2, two 
indicators: the labour union power and a collective disputes index. A summary of 
European employment laws and collective relations laws considered in our estimates are 
reported in Table 6. 
As one can see, according to the union power index, the polarization in Europe 
between opposite situations, as those represented, for instance, by UK and Germany 
                                                 
26 Finally, a third indicator that measures various social security provisions has been introduced in the 
study of Botero et al. (2004). 
27 For the debate on institutions and labour market flexibility, see Nickell and Layard (1999). 
28 The degree of bargaining centralisation is also a relevant factor; as stressed by Bartelsman et al. (2004) 
”In decentralised wage-bargaining systems workers can appropriate a large part of the rents generated 
by successful innovations, thereby reducing incentives to innovate in the first place. The risk of hold-up 
can be partly mitigated when bargaining occurs at the national level (or at the industry level but with 
economy -wide co-ordination) and pins down a general frame for the wage schedule” (p.89). M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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clearly reflects some well-known differences between distinct regimes of institutional 
labour arrangements which a huge literature has compared in many surveys.  
For instance, in Germany, reforms have been carried out by unions, employers’ 
associations, firms, works councils, without a significant role for legal interventions.  
Internal restructuring has been obtained via flexible working times and labour 
mobility negotiated with unions, with company-level pacts, adopted in nearly half of the 
largest German companies. Half of these pacts, have been productivity pacts, aimed at 
adjusting working conditions, and involving “the extension of working hours (in most 
cases without wage compensation), measures against absenteeism, changes in work 
organization” (Hassel and Rehder, 2001). 
 
Table 6: Labour regulation in European economies 
Protection of 
fixed-term 
contracts
Protection 
of part-time 
contracts
Cost of 
increasing 
hours worked
Labour union 
power
Protection of 
workers during 
collective 
disputes
Austria 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,29
Belgium 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,42
Denmark 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,13
Finland 0,69 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,21
France 0,88 0,50 1,00 0,67 0,67
Germany 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,50
Ireland 0,00 1,00 0,04 0,43 0,50
Italy 0,94 0,50 1,00 0,43 0,83
Netherlands 0,00 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,50
Portugal 0,81 1,00 1,00 0,71 0,58
Spain 1,00 0,81 1,00 0,71 0,46
Sweden 0,44 1,00 1,00 0,62 0,46
United Kingdom 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,38
UE13 0,44 0,91 0,85 0,52 0,46
Czech Republic 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,43 0,43
Hungary 0,19 1,00 0,28 0,71 0,50
Slovenia 0,38 1,00 1,00 0,43 0,54
* Higher values correspond to more extensive legal protection of workers
13 Old member states
3 New Member States
 
Source: our elaborations on EUROSTAT and Botero et al. (2004) databases. 
  
The German restructuring process, “has entailed increased consensus-based 
decision making in firms with works council chairs playing a greater role in co-
management”(Carlin and Soskice, 2007, p. 4). These changes do not apply in the UK, 
featuring liberalizing economic reforms.  
For the full sample of the sixteen economies considered, Table 6 and Figure 12 
provide two main results. First, there are substantial differentials between European 
economies in the labour regulation of employment contracts and collective relations 
rules, with Portugal and Spain showing the highest protection and the UK the lowest.  
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Second, there is also substantial disparity in the composition of this regulation; for 
instance, the rigidity of fixed-term contract legislation is higher in France, Italy and 
Spain, which have the most stringent regulations; conversely a Nordic country like 
Sweden, which permits freer use of fixed-term contracts, has clearly defined rules for 
collective relations and more stringent provisions for part-time contracts.  
 
Figure 12: Summary index of Labour Regulation and its components 
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However, the measure of protection of workers confirms that European 
capitalism is quite heterogeneous in terms of labour regulation.  
Additional issues concern institutional interactions between employment 
regulation and other provisions, such as those governing wage setting. As known, 
employment protection increases the bargaining power of insiders, but reduces their 
fallback option because it lowers the probability of being re-employed for unemployed 
workers, with an ambiguous final effect on wage outcomes (Boeri and Van Ours, 2008, 
chapter 10).  
In our context, in which some causal links between institutional 
complementarities and MFP differentials are examined, these general assumptions need 
to be further explored. 
4. Econometric results 
The present section is devoted to estimate the main determinants of MFP growth 
over the period 1995-2005, and to explain sectoral-countries differentials. As briefly 
mentioned above, in addition to technical innovation, other explanatory variables must 
to be taken into account: organisational and institutional changes and unmeasured 
inputs (see the Appendix, Table A1, for a more detailed description of variables). 
The focus of the following investigation is distinguishing, among these variables, 
three different sets which can capture the role of some of these driving forces. M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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The first group refers to organizational variables in labour relationship measured 
by the growth rates of fixed term contracts, of part time contracts, and of costs of 
increasing hours worked (extensive and intensive margin labour utilisation). The second 
group concerns institutional variables related to labour protection of these arrangements 
and to collective relations, such as union power and protection of workers during 
collective disputes (see Appendix for a full description of this database). As mentioned 
above we also control for Product Market Regulation. The third determinant of MFP, 
captured by a single explanatory variable, refers to one of the main components of 
unmeasured inputs, i.e. R&D expenses.  
In order to analyse the impact on MFP (disaggregated at sectoral level) of labour 
protection laws (available at country level), we assumed that the difference in MFP 
growth between any pair of industries is equal to the expected value (E) of a function of 
labour protection measures (LP), multiplied by a function g of the difference between 
the labour flexibility propensities of the two industries
29: 
 
)) ( ( ] ln ln [ z
iht
z
ikt
z
it iht ikt g LP f MFP MFP E Λ − Λ = ∆ − ∆       (2) 
 
where  ikt MFP  denotes Multifactor productivity in industry j, country i and time t; 
k, and h index the pair of industries; z indexes labour regulation measures; Λ  indexes 
the size of the labour flexibility component which is protected (share of fixed-term and 
part-time contracts out of total employment, growth rate of increasing hours worked, 
share of employees out of total employment, share of workers involved in industrial 
disputes). 
We also assumed that f is linear and g is an identity function g(x) = x. In addition, 
our linear regression model included other organisational variables captured by the 
growth rate of fixed-term and part-time contracts, and innovation proxied by R&D. 
These last variables are taken at sector-country level and also work as controls. Thus, we 
estimated the following equation: 
 
st it st st st
n
st
z
it
z
ijt st D D PMR D R OV LP MFP ε + + + + + + Λ = ∆ & ln      (3) 
 
where s = 128 sector-country units (16 countries x 8 sectors); t = 1995,…2005; i = 
16 countries; j = 8 sectors; z = 1,…5 (protection of fixed-term contracts, part-time, 
costs of increasing hours worked, union power, collective disputes). We also included 
unmeasured innovative inputs (captured by R&D), a control for product market 
                                                 
29We omitted the change in LP over time (included by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn, 2009, p.14). This 
omission is explained by two main reasons. First, some of our labour regulation measures (those related 
to collective relations) did not change over the short period examined here. Second, change rates in 
labour protection, as used by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn (2009), showed little variability and their 
relative estimated coefficients were always non significant in the regressions performed.   
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regulation (PMRst) at sectoral level, st D , industry-by-time dummies, and  it D , country-by-
time dummies to control for highly sector-specific factors (and for their changes over 
the period) which have probably influenced MFP growth and which cannot be captured 
by means of the labour policy control variables included in our analysis. More precisely, 
industry-by-time dummies are an important control since sectors are intrinsically 
characterised by different degrees of volatility (Micco and Pages, 2006) and industries 
may be “in different stages of their life-cycle and exposed to different global demand 
dynamics. For instance, ICT-producing industries have experienced substantially faster-
than-average productivity growth in most countries in recent years.”(Bassanini, 
Nunziata and Venn, 2009, p. 364) 
Country-by-time dummies allow to control for all aggregate effects, not included 
in the specification; among others, country- specific business cycle may affect both the use 
of flexible arrangements and TFP growth. 
In addition, by including country-by-time dummies, we also control for other 
crucial factors, such as those country policy initiatives more or less oriented at creating a 
‘dynamic knowledge-based economy’. These country differentials have been recently 
stressed by van Ark et al. (2008, p. 42), who note that “Even though most European 
countries have begun to make changes to institutional arrangements that increase 
flexibility and competitiveness in labor and product markets, such changes vary greatly 
across countries”. Along the same lines, for the service sector, Inklaar et al. (2008), 
confirm country differentials, with some Nordic European economies, comparable to the 
US, while others, such as Italy and Spain, lie behind.  
A further aspect captured by country-time dummies is represented by the effects 
of BCE monetary policies and macroeconomic constraints imposed by the Maastricht 
parameters; this common setting has had differential country effects, imposing deflationary 
costs on those EU economies with higher public debts and causing detrimental effects 
on their productivity growth. 
Product market regulatory environments tend to be associated with restrictive 
regulations in labour markets
30 and should be included as determinants of MFP. Note, 
however, that sectoral-country indicators for product markets restrictive regulations are 
not available at the same sectoral level of disaggregation as other employment 
protection measures and their inclusion reduces the number of observations (see Table 
7, last column).
31  
It should be noted that specific tests stressed both heteroskedasticity across panels 
and autocorrelation within panels and for this reason we fitted panel-data linear model 
                                                 
30 Nicoletti et al. (2001) for the OECD countries found that the indicators for product and labour market 
restrictive regulations were closely associated, with a statistical correlation of 0.73, significant at the 1% 
level. 
31 For instance, for non manufacturing sectors, OECD Indicators of Regulation were calculated for 41 
ISIC rev3 sectors in 21 OECD countries over the period 1975 to 2003. These aggregations must be re-
classified to match them with non manufacturing sectors included in our database and obtained from 
the NACE rev.1 sections. Matching these indexes is an issue for future research. M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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by using the feasible generalized least squares method
32. The results obtained are shown 
in Table 7. 
The results obtained confirm not only the positive strategical role of R&D, but 
also the negative impact of fixed-term arrangements which tend to discourage training 
and the acquisition of firm-specific skills. Conversely, in those sectors-countries where 
the magnitude of fixed-term contracts is significant, stricter regulation of this 
contractual form influences MFP positively (see the coefficient of the interaction term 
“protection of fixed-term contracts x proportion of fixed-term contracts”). In other 
words, labour provisions for the protection of fixed-term contracts may offset the 
negative effects deriving from a pure increase in such arrangements, reversing the 
pattern of slow accumulation of job-related training associated with short-term 
positions.
33 
By contrast, positive but no significant effects are obtained for part-time 
occupations and, after all, as emphasised in OECD (1999, p. 21), “There are few 
theoretical reasons to expect the productivity per hour of a part-time worker to be lower 
than the productivity of a full-time worker, other things being equal”.  
The role of growth rates of annual averages of actual weekly hours and of their 
costs, turn out to be non-significant. 
Product market regulation has the expected sign, but is not significant; this result, 
obtained as said above, with a lower number of observations, deserves further 
investigations. 
The role of regulation of collective relations and of union power seems 
ambiguous and confirms that the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ face of these provisions balance each 
other, with offsetting effects.  
The impact of defensive clauses in confrontational environments, as measured by 
the protection of workers during collective disputes, and union power, an index that 
sums up various institutional devices, likely encourage pro-productivity practices, but 
also reinforce workers rent seeking behaviour, with inconclusive results. This outcome 
calls for deeper inquiry and a finer distinction between payoffs rights (wage bargaining) 
and decision rights (co-determination and workers councils) and their impacts on 
productivity performances. 
                                                 
32 All estimations are performed by means of STATA 10. Routines adopted, preliminary and post-
estimation tests are available upon request. 
33 As said above (Section 1, note 8), the dataset used in our study for labour employment regulation, 
aimed at estimating its influence on organizational changes and MFP, does not exactly coincide with the 
OECD EPL index. However, for the component present in both datasets, fixed-term contract 
regulation, the correlation is very high (r=0.81). The main difference is that the OECD index includes 
the maximum number of successive contracts, and uses a different weighting procedure and different 
cardinal summary values. In any case, the inclusion of the OECD indicator in econometric estimates 
does not alter our main findings. All estimates are available upon request.  
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Table 7: Labour market protection and MFP at country-sector level (panel data fitted with Feasible 
Generalised Least Squares) 
Obs. 924  924  924  924  600 
Groups 84  84  84  84  60 
Dependent Variable: MFP 
(growth rate)  1 2  3 4  5 
Explanatory variables           
Organizational variables           
-0.009* -0.014**  -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.017** 
Growth of fixed -term contracts  
(0.005) (0,006)  (0,006)  (0,006)  (0.007) 
0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.001 
Growth of part-time contracts  
(0.005)  (0,005)  (0,005)  (0,005)  (0,006) 
     -0,0048  -0.042  Cost of increasing hours worked 
* growth of weekly hours 
worked       (0,032)  (0.043) 
Institutional variables          
 0.157**  0.190**  0.182**  0.101  Protection of fixed-term 
Contracts x Proportion of fixed 
term contracts   (0,083)  (0,084)  (0,085)  (0.101) 
  0.006  -0.009  -0.027  0.068  Protection of part-time contracts 
x Proportion of part-time 
contracts    (0,055)  (0,056)  (0,057)  (0.082) 
   0.062  0.069  -0.087  Union Power x %employees out 
of total employment     (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.068) 
        0.002  Collective disputes x % 
employees involved in disputes          (0.003) 
       -0.076 
Product Market Regulation 
       (0.889) 
Unmeasured inputs           
0.433* 0.442**  0.445*  0.421**  0.163 
R&D 
(0.242) (0.245)  (0.245)  (0.240)  (0.247) 
Sector-by-Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-by-Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
100.883***  93.851***  89.965***  102.770***  102.030* 
Constant 
(4.398)  (3.118)  (5.150)  (3.533)  (4.133) 
Wald chi2  1216.48  1183.30 1253.04  1256.85  1193.64 
Prob > chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
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5. Conclusions 
Cross-national diversities are numerous and still play a key role, notwithstanding 
the manifest converging in a ‘market’ direction. Fundamental questions remain, as to the 
depth of their differentials in terms of growth and whether the so-called “market reliant 
countries” are more successful in terms of productivity performances.  
Although more research is needed to explore this issue, some preliminary findings 
have been obtained. First of all, there is a large variation in labour productivity and its 
components across European economies. A major portion of these differentials are 
found in multifactor productivity, while labour composition has played a minor role (as 
shown in Table 4). We find that, since 1995, European countries have not followed 
similar patterns of growth and further heterogeneity is caused by sectoral diversities: 
between-sector gaps are crucial and the worst performances of multifactor productivity 
are recorded in some service sectors (see Figure 3). As recalled by van Ark et al.(2008), 
Baumol spoke about the “cost disease of the service sector”, a sector which is inherently 
labour-intensive. Nevertheless, it is still not clear whether costs and magnitudes of this 
disease are uniform in all countries and we have still to ascertain which labour 
institutions are performing better.  
Our empirical estimates offer some answers: it seems likely that shorter term jobs 
and lower employment tenures discourage investments in skills, while labour regulation, 
which sustain long term relationships, may present some advantages and would seem to 
be preferable to short-term arrangements in collaborative relations and bargaining 
governability (see Table 5).  
These findings appear to confirm other recent studies, such as Dew-Becker and 
Gordon (2008), which show that within Europe a reduction in employment protection 
caused a decline in productivity growth, offsetting the benefit of higher employment. 
The present study, which includes the sectoral dimension, shows that in labour intensive 
sectors, and where propensities to use flexible labour arrangements are higher, some 
forms of labour regulation mitigate the perverse effects of these arrangements on MFP.  
These results require additional support from further research and could be 
fruitfully enriched by the use of a more dimensional perspective. It should be borne in 
mind that the four better performers of our sample (Ireland, UK, Finland and Sweden) 
belong to different varieties of capitalism and have neither the same market-reliant 
arrangements, nor the same sectoral fields of specialisation. In an enlarged perspective, 
complementarities in labour, financial and product market regulation should be taken 
into account with the intent, above all, of discovering their impact on growth. The 
present study is only a first step in this direction.   
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
406 
References 
Aghion P., Griffith R. (2005), Competition and Growth, Reconciling Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press. 
Autor D.H., Kerr W.R., Kugler A.D. (2007), ‘Do Employment Protections Reduce 
Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States’, Economic Journal, 117, 189-217. 
Bartelsman E., Bassanini A., Haltiwanger J., Jarmin R., Scarpetta S. and Schank T. (2004), 
‘The Spread Of Ict And Productivity Growth. Is Europe Really Lagging Behind In The New 
Economy?’ , The ICT Revolution, Cohen et al, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1-140. 
Bassanini A. et al. (2005), ‘Workplace Training in Europe’, IZA Working Papers, 1640 
Bassanini A., Nunziata L., Venn D. (2009), ‘Job Protection Legislation and Productivity Growth 
in OECD Countries’, Economic Policy, 24, 349-402. 
Bassanini A. and Venn D. (2007), ‘Assessing the impact of labour market policies on 
productivity: a difference-in-differences approach’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration 
Working Paper, OECD, Paris. 
Belot M., J. Boone and van Ours J.C. (2007), ‘Welfare-Improving Employment Protection’, 
Economica, 74, 381-396. 
Bertola G. (1994), ‘Flexibility, Investment, and Growth’, Journal of Monetary Economics, 34, 215–
238. 
Bertola G. (2008), Labor Market Regulation: motives, measures, effects, mimeo. 
Blanchard O., Landier A., (2002), ‘The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reforms: 
Fixed Duration Contracts in France’, Economic Journal, 112, 214 -244.  
Boeri T., Garibaldi P. (2007), ‘Two Tier Reforms Of Employment Protection: A Honeymoon 
Effect?’, Economic Journal, 117, 357–385. 
Boeri T., Jimeno J. (2005), ‘The effects of employment protection: Learning from variable 
enforcement’, European Economic Review, 49, 2057-2077. 
Boeri T., van Ours J. (2008), The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.  
Botero J. C. et al. (2002), ‘The Regulation of Labor’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 1339-1382. 
Cahuc P., Postel-Vinay F. (2002), ‘Temporary jobs, Employment Protection, and Labor Market 
Performance’, Labour Economics, 9, 63-91. 
Carlin W., Soskice D. (2007), ‘Reforms, Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Performance in 
Germany’, CEPR Discussion Paper, 6415.  
Conway P., Nicoletti G. (2006), ‘Product Market Regulation in the Non-Manufacturing Sectors 
of OECD Countries: Measurement and Highlights’, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 
530. 
Dew-Becker I., Gordon R.J. (2008), ‘The Role of Labor Market Changes in the Slowdown of 
European Productivity Growth’, NBER Working Paper, 13840. 
Dolado J.J., Garcia-Serrano C., Jimeno J. F. (2002), ‘Drawing Lessons from the Boom of 
Temporary Jobs in Spain’, Economc Journal, 112, 270- 295. 
Engellandt A., Riphahn R. (2004), ‘Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort’, CEPR 
Discussion Paper , 4178. 
European Commission (2004), Industrial Relations in Europe, European Commission Directorate-
General for Employment and Social Affairs, Unit D, Brussels.  M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
407
EUROSTAT (1997), ‘Part-Time Work in the European Union’, Statistics in Focus, 13, Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 
Freeman R.B. (2007), ‘Labour market institutions around the world’, NBER Working Papers, 
13242. 
Freeman R. B., Lazear E. P. (1995), ‘An economic analysis of works councils’, Works Councils: 
Consultation, Representation, Cooperation, Rogers J. and Streeck W. (eds.), Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press for NBER, 27-50. 
Freeman R.B., Medoff J.M. (1984), What do unions do?, New York, Basic Books. 
Foster L., Haltiwanger J., Krizan C.J. (2006), ‘Market Selection, Reallocation and Restructuring 
in the US Retail Trade Sector in the 1990s’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 88, 748-758. 
Garibaldi P., (2006), Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press. 
Goux D., Maurin E., Pauchet M. (2001), ‘Fixed-term contracts and the dynamics of labour 
demand’, European Economic Review, 45, 533-552.  
Güell M. (2000), ‘Fixed-term contracts and unemployment: an efficiency wage analysis’, 
University of Princeton, IRS working paper, 433. 
Hassel A., Rehder B. (2001), ‘Institutional Change in the German Wage Bargaining System- The 
Role of Big Companies’, MPIFG Working Paper,  01/9. 
Hopenhayn H., Rogerson R. (1993), ‘Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis’, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 915-938. 
Krueger A. (1991), ‘The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States’, 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 44, 644–660. 
Inklaar R., Timmer M.P., van Ark B., (2008), ‘Market services productivity across Europe and 
the US’, Economic Policy, 53, 139-194  
La Porta R. et al. (1998), ‘Law and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113-1155. 
La Porta R., De Silanes F., Shleifer A., (1999), ‘Corporate ownership around the world’, The 
Journal of Finance, 54, 471-517. 
Malcomson J. (1999), ‘Individual Employment Contracts’, Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Ashenfelter O. and Card D. (eds.), Amsterdam. North Holland  
Micco A., Pages C. (2006), ‘The Economic Effects of Employment Protection: Evidence from 
International Industry-Level Data’, IZA Discussion Paper, 2433. 
Nicoletti G. et al. (2001), ‘Interactions between product and labour market regulations: Do they 
affect employment? Evidence from OECD countries’, OECD, Economics Department Working 
Papers, 312. 
Nicoletti, G., Scarpetta S. (2003), ‘Regulation, Productivity, and Growth, OECD Evidence,’ 
Economic Policy, 36, 9-72. 
Nickell, S.J., Layard R. (1999): ‘Labour market institutions and economic performance’, 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Ashenfelter O. and Card D. (eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
OECD (1999), Employment Outlook, Paris. 
OECD (2004), Employment Outlook, Paris. 
OECD (2007), ‘More Jobs but less productive? The impact of labour market policies on 
productivity’ (Chapter 2), in Employment Outlook, Wired at 
http://www.oecd.org/els/employment outlook/2007> 
Pissarides C. (2001), ‘Employment Protection’, Labour Economics, 8, 131-159. 
Saint-Paul G. (2002), ‘Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation’, 
European Economic Review, 46, 375-395.  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
408 
Schivardi F., Torrini R. (2008), ‘Identifying the effects of firing restrictions through size-
contingent differences in regulation’, Labour Economics, 15, 482-511. 
Solow R. (1957), ‘Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function’, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 39, 312-320. 
Timmer M., van Moergastel T., Stuivenwold E. (2007), EU KLEMS growth and productivity 
accounts, Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
van Ark B., O’Mahony M., Timmer M.P., (2008) ‘The productivity gap between Europe and the 
United States: trends and causes’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22, 25-44. 
Wasmer E. (2002), ‘Interpreting Europe and US labour market differences: the specificity of 
human capital investments’, IZA Discussion Paperr, 549 
 
APPENDIX 
FIGURE A.1: Labour productivity (hourly) and hours worked by sector (Average annual growth rate 
1995-2005) 
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FIGURE A.1: Labour productivity (hourly) and hours worked by sectors (Average 
annual growth rate 1995-2005) (continued) 
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Table A1: Description of variables 
 
MFP 
(growth rate) 
Growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EU KLEMS database 
Fixed-term 
Contracts  
(growth rate) 
Growth rate of Fixed-Term Contracts (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EUROSTAT 
Part-time 
contracts  
(growth rate) 
Growth rate of Part-Time Contracts (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EUROSTAT 
Hours worked 
(growth rate) 
Growth of weekly hours worked (sectoral-country data) 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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Protection of 
fixed- term 
contracts 
Protection of fixed-term contracts:  
Degree of protection of fixed-term contracts x proportion of fixed-term contracts 
Degree of protection of fixed-term contracts (country data): 
It measures the cost of fixed-term contracts, computed as the average of two variables. The first 
one is equal one if fixed-term contracts are allowed only: (1) for jobs that are temporary by nature; 
(2) for temporary vacancies to replace a permanent worker in maternity or sickness leave; (3) for 
training contracts; (4) for seasonal work; and/or (5) if the law expressly states that the will of the 
parties involved in the contract is not a good enough reason for entering into a fixed-term 
contract. Equals zero otherwise.The second variable is the normalised maximum duration of 
fixed-term contracts. 
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al.(2004)  
Proportion of fixed-term contracts: 
Incidence of workers with fixed-term contracts on total employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
Protection of 
part-time 
contracts 
Protection of Part-Time contracts:  
Degree of protection of part-time contracts x proportion of part-time contracts 
Degree of protection of part-time contracts (country data): 
It measures the existence and cost of part-time contracts computed as the average of 1) a dummy 
variable equal to one, if part-time workers enjoy the mandatory benefits of full-time workers, 2) a 
dummy variable equal to one, if terminating part-time workers is at least as costly as terminating 
full-time workers.  
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al.(2004)  
Proportion of part-time contracts (sectoral-country data): 
Incidence of workers with part-time contracts on total employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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  Cost of 
increasing 
 hours worked 
Cost of Overtime x Growth of weekly hours worked: 
 Cost of overtime (country data): 
The cost of overtime measures the cost of increasing hours worked obtained by calculating the 
“normal” hours of work per year in each country (excluding overtime, vacations, holidays, etc.). 
When the hours worked exceed this maximum, a firm uses overtime.  
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al.(2004)  
Growth of weekly hours worked (sectoral-country data): 
Source: EUROSTAT M. Damiani and F. Pompei, Labour protection and productivity in EU economies: 1995-2005 
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  Union Power 
Index 
Degree of protection and bargaining power of unions x proportion of employees 
Degree of protection and bargaining power of unions (country data): 
It is computed as the average of the following seven dummy variables which are one: 1) if 
employees have the right to unionise, 2) if employees have the right to collective bargaining, 3) if 
employees have the legal duty to bargain with unions, 4) if collective contracts are extended to 
third parties by law, 5) if the law allows closed shops, 6) if workers, or unions, or both, have the 
right to appoint members to the Boards of Directors, 7) if workers’ councils are mandated by law. 
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al.(2004)  
Proportion of employees (sectoral-country data): 
Incidence of employees on total employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
  Collective 
disputes Index 
Protection of workers during collective disputes:  
Protection of collective disputes x proportion of workers involved in collective disputes 
Protection of collective disputes (country data): 
This indicator is computed as the average of the following eight dummy variables which are one: 
1) if employer lockouts are illegal, 2) if workers have the right to industrial action, 3) if wildcat, 
political, and sympathy/solidarity/ secondary strikes are legal, 4) if there is no mandatory waiting 
period or notification requirement before strikes can occur, 5) if striking is legal even if there is a 
collective agreement in force, 6) if laws do not mandate conciliation procedures before a strike, 7) 
if third-party arbitration during a labour dispute is mandated by law, 8) if it is illegal to fire or 
replace striking workers. 
Source: laws of each country, elaborations of Botero et al.(2004)  
Proportion of workers involved in collective disputes (sectoral-country data) 
Incidence of workers involved in collective disputes on total employment 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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R&D 
Sectoral R&D expenses standardised to value added 
Source: EUROSTAT 
 